Cosmopolitanism Revisited:
The Need for More than Armchair Thinking

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A cosmopolitan ethic is commonly understood to refer to a universalistic morality that eschews parochial, especially national, limitations or prejudices. More positively, a cosmopolitan ethical perspective entails the acknowledgement of some notion of common humanity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this humanity. H. C. Baldry refers to it as an “attitude of mind” centered on the notion of human unity. Martha Nussbaum defines a cosmopolitan as someone “whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world.” The universality and generality of a cosmopolitan ethical orientation ultimately have their roots in a universalist conception of the right and the good. As Nussbaum states elsewhere in the same article, the cosmopolitan stance asks us “to give our first allegiance to what is morally good—and that which, being good, I can commend as such to all human beings.” Cosmopolitanism so conceived as ethical universalism presents a clear and provocative challenge to the ethical particularism of national and other more parochial sources claiming our moral allegiance (Catherine Lu 2000, 245-67).

Cosmopolitanism is back. For some that is good news. Shaking off the negative connotations of its past (when Jews, communists, and cosmopolitans were so frequently cast as traitors to national solidarities), it is now portrayed by many (most eloquently by Held [1995]) as a unifying vision for democracy and governance in a world so dominated by a globalizing capitalism that it seems there is no viable political-economic alternative for the new millennium. The bad news is that cosmopolitanism has acquired so many nuances and meanings as to negate its putative role as a unifying ethic around which to build the requisite international regulatory institutions that would ensure global economic, ecological, and political security in the face of an out-of-control, free-market liberalism (David Harvey 2000, 529-64).
Introduction

This article shall have three interrelated parts. Part One will be an examination of the varied things that cosmopolitanism is and has been. This, as we shall see in Part Three, sits uncomfortably with what most philosophers and political scientists (including myself) have said about cosmopolitanism and particularly how they have abstractly characterized it. In Part Two I shall set out my crafted and, I hope, reasonably rationalized characterization and defense of cosmopolitanism within the general parameters of how it has been conceptualized in the more or less analytical philosophical and social science literature, though, of course, I shall give it my own twist and a defense of that twist. In Part Three, I shall argue, as my subtitle advertises, that we—most particularly we philosophers—need to get out of our armchairs at least in this domain and in good anthropological, sociological and historical fashion study our social world. This will in part be launched in Part One as well. We very much need an engagement in such work as well as economic work here in making our generalizations and examinations of them. We philosophers have remained, at least here, too much in our armchairs. In doing the work I shall do in Part Two, we shall see that it very much also needs that empirical work, though the relation is reciprocal as well. We theoreticians of cosmopolitanism, even if we are pragmatists or neo-pragmatists or Wittgensteinians, must not stand in an anthropological and historical vacuum.

At the end of their informed, accurate, perceptive but not uncritical introduction to their collection of some of my articles on political philosophy (Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will), David Rondel and Alex Sager remark:

[While Nielsen at times resembles Dewey or Rorty in rejecting theory and advocating practical measures, he in many respects remains a
highly abstract theorist. He is somebody who has dedicated most of his life to philosophy. Readers will look in vain in his books and essays for detailed analyses of economic and sociological literature. Instead, they will find careful, often compelling philosophical arguments, but relatively little in terms of specific evidence (Rondel and Sager 2012, xxxiii).

This is exactly on the mark. This, unfortunately, is all I can do with any competence. I do not regard this as a virtue but as a fact not to be emulated. It is all my training enables me to do competently, namely a little stable cleaning, some more or less systematic conceptual clarification and the making, in the light of this, some substantive moral and otherwise normative claims. I do not suggest that this is of no importance let alone something to be disposed of or discounted. It is of some importance, though philosophers tend to oversell it. What I say in Part Two concerning cosmopolitanism is in that mode, though I hope I am not overselling it. But, as I shall try to show in Parts One and Three, that such work has its limitations; hence, my plea for more fieldwork here.

When I studied anthropology along with philosophy, there was no such thing as urban anthropology. Now there is, and it is no longer so much in order to repeat Stuart Hampshire’s quip that the difference between anthropology and sociology is that in the former you learn something in the latter you don’t. The times have changed and with them relevant methodologies. What is at issue here will be faced in Part Three.
Part One: What Is Cosmopolitanism?

I

What we must avoid here is (a) being essentialist and (b) being stipulatively arbitrary once we see that essentialism is impossible. By ‘essentialism’ I mean the idea that in characterizing cosmopolitanism or anything else of substance, essentialists claim that we must specify a set of properties that all and only a given concept has, something that is given to and constitutive of that concept. With that we specify something’s essence. We have done that only when we have established that condition. Then we have unearthed something’s essence. To understand properly what cosmopolitanism is on that account, we must give its essence; give, that is, what is common to and distinctive of cosmopolitanism and of all and only cosmopolitanisms. We must set out the properties that when taken together are distinctive of cosmopolitanism and only of cosmopolitanism. That is how, essentialists claim, we can genuinely specify cosmopolitanism. We ascertain this by examining all the things that all and only the proper uses of ‘cosmopolitanism’ denote and then note what are the common and distinctive set of properties of these uses of ‘cosmopolitanism’. In this way we ascertain the connotation of ‘cosmopolitanism’. The same thing, essentialists claim, obtains for any concept (C. I. Lewis).

If we didn’t learn long ago from Hume that there is no such thing as essences, that recognition has in somewhat various ways been stamped in by Ryle, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam and Goodman. We have no such conception of cosmopolitanism or anything else of substance. However, it doesn’t, of course, follow that we can mean just anything we care to stipulate by ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’. By attending to these uses, Wittgensteinly or Austinly, we can make some useful distinctions for some clearly specified purposes. We don’t gain essences, but we capture some useful
characteristics enabling us to characterize what cosmopolitanism is. I shall try to illustrate this in what follows.

II

It is useful in characterizing what cosmopolitanism or anything else is, except perhaps some very technical terms, to follow J. L Austin’s advice and start with dictionaries. Consulting an assortment of English dictionaries, I found the following for ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘cosmopolitanism’:

1. *South African Concise Oxford Dictionary*
   1.1 familiar with or representative of many different countries and cultures
   1.2 having something exciting and glamorous associated with travel and a mixture of cultures

2. *The Canadian Oxford Dictionary*
   2.1 free from national limitations or prejudices
   2.2 sophisticated; worldly

   3.1 belonging to all parts of the world; not restricted to any one country or its inhabitants
   3.2 free from national limitations or attachments
   3.3 indifference to constitutions and religions
   3.4 cosmopolite: citizen of the world
   3.5 cosmopolite: one who has no attachments or prejudices
   3.6 at home in all parts of the world
   3.7 a man [sic] of the world

4. *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*
   4.1 common to the whole world
   4.2 at home in all parts of the earth or in many spheres of interest
   4.3 cosmopolite: a cosmopolitan person

There are several things that surprised me about these dictionary definitions. For full disclosure, I should first say that for all I have written in the past about cosmopolitanism I have never looked up the word in a dictionary until now. Dictionaries aside, I first began to think seriously about it after reading Martha Nussbaum and then through her the Greek Cynics, the Stoics generally, and

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1 This is surely mistaken in taking that all or even most cosmopolitans have no national attachments and that all indifferent to constitutions and religions.
most particularly the Roman Stoics, and later reading Condorcet and Kant’s writings on cosmopolitanism. I shall call this ‘classical cosmopolitanism’ and I shall characterize it in the next few paragraphs.

What I mean by ‘classical cosmopolitanism’ is a universalistic moral and political point of view, a way of life, that articulates a view of life where human beings are taken, unless severely damaged as early infants or later, to be rational and reasonable beings who can, with luck, take a proper humanly oriented view of life. It is a moral view that among other things crucially takes it that the life of everyone matters and matters equally. Such a concern for humanity involves and crucially has as its deepest element a recognition that everyone is equally to be respected. Something that should normally show itself in how humans relate to each other. All human beings, at least potentially, are equally respect-worthy and all should be respected and equally so. That begins to show itself, or so such cosmopolitans believe, early on in infancy and more fully later in all but the most severely damaged human beings. There is deep within us a mutual concern and respect for all human beings. It does not take a special enculturation though sometimes, to some extent often, a special enculturation can undermine the rather common belief among traditional classical cosmopolitans that some commitment to humanity is universal. But the recent laws about homosexuality and transgender support the reality of this. So we have in societies white dominance over black lives. The Black Lives Matter movement did not rise out of thin air. And the recent equal respect for homosexuals and transgendered people did not either. Unfortunately, it only fragilely obtains even now. That all people and peoples are to be respected was ingrained into classical cosmopolitan belief. But, as a matter of fact, not everybody in every culture has such a belief. It is an exception rather than the typical. It was not a belief that the typical Roman had, the typical Inca or Aztec had, the typical slave owner had, the typical Papua New Guinean had, the typical Nazi had, the typical Taliban had, the typical resident of India or Pakistan or Syria has or the typical employers or their assistants have concerning indentured labor. These laborers in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are brutally exploited.
It is sometimes an exploitation that comes to virtual slavery. This treatment, though usually not quite so savage, is frequent in many places in the world. This goes with a certain distinctive enculturation. But so does it for those who have a cosmopolitan attitude and a cosmopolitan orientation. But we have many different enculturations in our world. Many cosmopolitans, though not all, have little understanding of why they think and act as they do. However, that many people, some unconsciously, stand outside the cosmopolitan circle is evident. Think of G. W. Bush, Rick Perry, John Diefenbaker, Jean Chretien, Michelle Bachman, to say nothing of the spectacular Donald Trump. They are obvious political paradigms.

It is unfortunately very common to think, as not a few non-cosmopolitans do, that some people or peoples other than themselves are inferior to them. In southwest Michigan, where I spent part of the time growing up, a small immigrant group of Lithuanians were very prejudiced against the rather wealthier Dutch immigrants. And, I suspect, but do not know, that that dislike was reciprocated. In the settlement of the Dakotas (before there was a South and North Dakota), there was strife and on both their parts and conceptions of superiority and dislike between Norwegian settlers and Irish ones while they both remained united against the dwindling resident Native American Indian populations.

To give a case of unwitting anti-cosmopolitanism, consider the following. I remember in Apartheid South Africa a South African professor of mathematics, a much respected professor, thought of as being on the ‘more liberal wing’ of the Apartheid intellectual establishment, such as it was, telling me that he had never met a woman (white or black) who had much talent for mathematics. The implication was that neither blacks nor women, because of their race or gender or both, had such talent. This, if it showed anything, showed nothing about race or gender but a lot about a certain enculturation. Any more than that Luxembourgers score better at foreign language acquisition than Australians shows anything about race or gender but rather shows that
Luxembourgers are better situated, better located, than Australians for language acquisition. We should not try to root such contingencies into race or gender or anything otherwise biological.

III

I shall principally in Part Two rationally reconstruct classical cosmopolitanism and in doing so de-mythologize a Stoic engendered moral point of view. This will involve considerable rational reconstruction. But I shall argue that this is worth it. But it is important to keep in mind that the Greek and Roman conception is the underlying conception that gave birth in the West to cosmopolitanism. And this as extended in distinctive ways by Enlightenment perspectives of such different philosophers as Condorcet, Hume and Kant though they were rooted in these ancient conceptions and that they were in turn given contemporary articulation, though insufficiently de-mythologized, by Martha Nussbaum and Kwame Anthony Appiah. But it is important not to forget the classical roots of such a cosmopolitanism. We can also reasonably hope that Enlightenment values will similarly gain cultural ascendancy. So this cosmopolitanism will just become part of what it is to take a moral and reasonable human point of view. But one does not have to be a Calvinist to regard this as extremely problematic. And it is also problematic that something like that will gain cultural hegemony. Particularly cross-cultural hegemony which is necessary for classical cosmopolitanism or for something like it to gain human purchase.

I should add rather parenthetically that Kant’s writings on cosmopolitanism came to the attention of Kantian scholars only later in the day. Until recently, they were not even noted in Kantian bibliographies. Around 1950, I took a yearlong seminar on Kant. First we read the Prolegomena and then Metaphysics of Morals, then the three critiques, and finally Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. This was no doubt a far too rapid read. But the point I want to make here is just that no mention was made in the seminar of Kant’s writings on cosmopolitanism or that through all his teaching career at the University of Koningsburg Kant regularly taught anthropology and geography as well
as philosophy. I suspect the professor of the seminar I took knew nothing about this. (See David Harvey 2000, 191.)

However, much later my readings on cosmopolitanism (including those by Kant) made me think of cosmopolitanism as mainly what is now called *moral cosmopolitanism* with its political and institutional accoutrements and its account of human nature. This is the kind of cosmopolitanism, I shall argue, that is to be adhered to (Lu 2000, 244-67). My worry is that this is endemically utopian.

IV

I have argued that cosmopolitanism has been and still is many different things. It has sometimes been an elitist view of the dominant and, not infrequently, the ruling class and of people with contemptuous views of the way of living and doing things of ordinary people. Understandably, Bolsheviks despised these cosmopolitans. These elitist cosmopolitans regard the lower class as an untutored ignorant class, vulgar and with a tendency to mob-life—what reactionaries call ‘the low life’. Though such cosmopolitans are sophisticated so that they usually do not go on about it crudely Mitt Romney style. But they have contempt for the lower classes, though usually disguised (though I once heard McCain utter it in contempt of protesters). Their only concern for them was to keep them in good working order and feed them enough so they can work well at the work for which they had been trained. (Think of the German educational system of the 1950s.) But their care ends with matters like that. This is a well-known kind of cosmopolitan: sophisticated, often with mild-mannered non-Trump like people who don’t give a damn about the people below them except instrumentally. Though they don’t go on about it. They include the upstairs-downstairs of wealthy British households of times not so long ago and for our time what Joseph Stiglitz calls the folks “Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%” (Stiglitz 2011, 1).

Sometimes, by contrast, some cosmopolitans have had the view of other intellectual elites who even in their otherwise considerable diversity think that there is a rational and morally desirable
kernel of belief and response commonly human that is recognized by all those elites that even with all their diversity all humans have or potentially have except in early infancy or when badly injured. This common humanity should be acknowledged and respected, but this common core does not entail or in any way justify the classical cosmopolitan’s belief in human equality or at least approximate human equality. There are other cosmopolitans who believe there are those born to serve and those born to command, or if not born to should so command because of their special abilities and there are those who should serve. There are just those with different capacities and different abilities and their resultant different stations in life with its resultant duties. And it is important to acknowledge, they think, these differences when we order society. There are those with such an emphasis: not only F. H. Bradley but quite differently there was Nietzsche who believed so and in a strange manner proclaimed that there were those who were born to order. There were the ‘higher men’ who were born to do the ordering. It was not that Nietzsche was like the Nazis in believing that it was something racial. Something biologically attuned to race. But Nietzsche resolutely believed there were people with different capacities having something which entitled them their distinct and superior positions in society that those without them were not entitled to. There was, they thought, the Master Race, even though ‘the Master Race’ was not itself a race.

To put it at the extreme, there were couch potatoes and disciplined persons of genius. The former were just there to use when they were useful. Still, they had different entitlements and were deserving of different respect, or so some of those ‘higher men’ thought. It was the ‘higher man’ who was for Nietzsche always a man. Or was this a manner of speech? But it was this ‘higher being’ that Nietzsche deemed alone worthy of consideration. They were, it was thought, the cosmopolitan elite. This is not the cosmopolitanism that I would rationally reconstruct. But for Nietzsche, the elite and, in varying degrees, for others this was the cosmopolitan elite.

There is another distinctively different kind of cosmopolitanism stance which is deserving of reflective attention in a pro-attitude manner. Sometimes, again distinctly, cosmopolitanism is a
morally indifferent view of another sophisticated group of people. They are morally indifferent because, concerning the various moral and other normative views of the various sophisticates, it is simply a matter of you pay you money and you take your choices. Moral matters are nothing to get exercised about. That, such cosmopolitans, such worldly persons, believe is how a truly sophisticated person will reason and view things. To think otherwise is to be naïve and Quixotically out of tune with reality.

When one is engaged in a society, such cosmopolitans believe, where for at least the persons who run the show, one should, at least outwardly, do what is the thing done in that society without any consideration at all of what their view is or whether there could be a right view or that one view among the views that follow such a cosmopolitanism is superior to another. Just take from the various things done, when you can, what would yield the more commodious life for you and your intimates and your friends free from all commitments to a way of life that concerns itself more widely with what is in the human interest. Even if that is something that can be ascertained do not concern yourself with that except where it is instrumentally valuable to your more limited interests. Don’t concern yourself with whether we can attain a moral point of view. The thing to do is to be a person of good morals, not to be a morally good person. The latter is something that is very likely to be a moralistic illusion. Be reasonable and don’t worry your head about that. Where there is a moral point of view that a principled person would have to take is something that as reasonable worldly persons we can and indeed rationally should ignore. Be sensible and don’t worry your head about that. Do the most convenient thing. It is no doubt wise, prudently sensible, to look out for yourself, your intimates, and your friends. But a sophisticated worldly and cosmopolitan person will not widen that circle. Be sophisticated, stay loose and be uncommitted concerning yourself, at least out of prudence, only with what yields the most commodious life for yourself and those who just happen to be close to you. Don’t be a Kantian befogging yourself into thinking that reason requires more than that. Being ‘morally good’ in reality is to be a person of good morals. To be, that is, someone who can fit into
doing the thing wherever you are. In Damascus as well as Detroit. Forget all this Kantian blather about being a good person. A person of principle. That is not the way things go, worldly cosmopolitans cynically think. To be a Kantian is to be captured by an illusion. Nothing like this is needed. Just go as comfortably as you can with the flow. Forget about being a morally good person. That is just to be caught in ideology. Be a worldly cosmopolitan that does not get excited about making our world better. That is just a fool’s dance. Just learn such a cosmopolitan would say, if they would go in for advice, to get on in the world as commodiously as you can. That should be your aspiration. This along with staying loose should be your aspiration wherever you are. This should be the way to be at home in the world. That is an effete cosmopolitan’s way. That is indeed a common way of being cosmopolitan. But it is not the way to be my kind of cosmopolitan or a cosmopolitan in the classical mode and it is certainly not Bernie Sanders’ deck of cards. It is not a humanistic cosmopolitanism. The view I shall seek to rationally reconstruct is rather a relaxed cosmopolitan view of a way of rejecting such a cosmopolitanism.

Then there is the view that I have called the classical version of cosmopolitanism. This is a view that is both moral and political and that is as well institutional where we are to regard all persons as being of equal worth where every life matters and matters equally, where we are all citizens of the world, free of prejudices and with no practices which will override the practices and the universal norms of citizens of the world. It is the view that I argue for as a rational reconstructed form of the world. I seek to make it something that is not a utopian illusion. It is utopian but, if it is worth holding for, it is not merely utopian. That a sound case can be made for that is not at all evident. For someone who is just a neutral observer of the world, they might very well be very skeptical.

There are many kinds of such cosmopolitans: anarchist (socialist or otherwise), non-anarchist socialists (Marxist or otherwise), anti-capitalists wary of both socialism and anarchism, center leftists principally social democrats, social liberals who are less leftist liberals than the social democrats, communitarians, and non-communitarian conservatives. Among this varied lot there are
liberal socialists such as Rawls, anarchist socialists such as Chomsky, straightforwardly Marxist socialists such as Isaac Deutscher, individualist anarchist-leaning conservatives such as John Gray, conservatives such as Oakshott, and Thomists such as Jacques Maritain. There are all sorts of mixtures that do not fit comfortably into my classificatory categorization. But there is no reason to scratch any of them out of such a cosmopolitan categorization.

Remember David Harvey’s remark that I quoted at the beginning of this article. Harvey points out that cosmopolitanism has been taken by many to be a unifying vision for democracy and good governance. But Harvey is right on the mark when he says that “cosmopolitanism has acquired so many nuances and meanings as to negate its putative role as a unifying ethic around which to build the requisite international regulatory institutions that would ensure global economic, ecological, and political security in the fact of out-of-control free market liberalism” (Harvey 2000, 529-64). That is something I shall be very concerned with.

V

We should now go into the tangle that is cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans have *usually* been from the liberal center. But there has been a considerable number from the left and from the left-leaning center. There have been a few conservatives as well (Burke, Oakshott, Hayek, Kissinger, Nozick, Friedman and Elliot). There are even fascist intellectuals who are cosmopolitans, e.g., Carl Schmidt, Richard Strauss and Ezra Pound are prominent but very different examples. There are, moreover, some politicians who in some ways are cosmopolitan and in some ways not. Obama, Kerry and the Clintons are all highly educated, sophisticated, world travelled, but they also go on ethnocentrically about America’s superlative greatness. If they really believe what they are saying, as they might not, and are not just saying it for propaganda purposes, it certainly is a mark of ethnocentrism on their part that is incompatible with cosmopolitanism, however conceived. Obama routinely carries out target killings to such an extent that Cornel West believes he, along with some
recent illustrious predecessors, should all be tried as war criminals. This is not in accord with classical cosmopolitanism, though it is with varieties of cosmopolitanism and paradigmatically so with the cosmopolitanism that Henry Kissinger and Carl Schmidt are charter members of.

Cosmopolitans of the moral and classical sort should not accept or yield to either snobbish or amoral cosmopolitanism. ‘Snobbish cosmopolitanism’, though not under that label, comes trippingly on the tongue for many with strong tastes and distastes and from some people with strong and rather inflexible beliefs about what should be done. Even for people who in a cool hour acknowledge, perhaps ambivalently, this inflexibility in themselves. Yet even when they realize or suspect in moments of clarity that a belief of theirs is rather dogmatic, they usually remain in a state of denial. That notwithstanding, their inflexibility is still strong. It is hard to dislodge or dissolve these strong and inflexible beliefs, or even to come to get their holders to question them. It meshes well with their engrained sense of superiority that is common to many of those fortunately situated recipients of a good education and living in a reasonably protected environment and living a reasonably secure life, including one that is economically secure. And it can also fuel, though irrationally, their self-images.

However, if they are at all reflective, they will realize that along the way many of them, very likely many, had some free rides. What I am talking about here can be seen in the attitudes of particularly some undergraduates as well as graduate students of elite universities and some of their professors. But they are not alone.

VI

I am committed to a rational reconstruction of classical cosmopolitanism with its distinctive moral conception of human relationships. However, for all of the widening of my sympathies I find, for example, it hard for me not to react with distaste and disdain to most rap music. Some of it, I am told, has sufficient challenging political thrust to somewhat compensate for its manner. Yet it has a manner, though perhaps not the matter, which I continue to find distasteful. But cosmopolitan people
of the sort I defend should not react so. I still can’t help but feel that an attunement to such music is a mark of inferior taste and sensibilities. The very liking of it reveals, so I feel, inferiority. But is this not ethnocentrism on my part and in effect anti-cosmopolitan? I similarly feel it is another mark of inferiority to be extensively tattooed. Any tattooing evokes mild displeasure in me. However, I do not feel that way, perhaps inconsistently, about Polynesians of past times and places but only of my tattooed contemporaries. To be told that tattooing helps give some of us a mark of identity does not mollify my feelings, though it does add a little somewhat to my understanding. I feel similarly about people who routinely wear their caps indoors.

I seek, unsuccessfully, not to find such things distasteful though successfully not to react in a noticeably negative way to them. After all, it is the tattooed’s own business. It is not skin off my nose, though I will indeed find such tattooing distasteful. I wish these things would disappear, but that is another matter. I would not for a moment try to legislate or otherwise enforce their disappearance, though I wish rap music would pass into a soon forgotten musical history and tattooing would become a thing of the past. And that people would stop talking so loudly in cafes or restaurants.

I am even more disgusted by bullfighting and I would ban it where it is legal if I could. But I would ban it because it is cruel, as were the Roman gladiatorials, not because it is vulgar or because it tends to bring out bad sides in people. There are a lot of things, professional wrestling for another example, that do that we should not ban or try to, but only hope they will eventually totter off the stage to be seen and heard no more. Cosmopolitans, as well as others, including snobs, should just learn to live with them and hope for their peaceful and untrammeled demise. If there could be ersatz bullfighting where they ‘killed’ artificial bulls, I would find it vulgar and bringing out bad sides in people. But not try to ban it. I am also offended by people who shout on the street without good reason or by people who talk loudly in a restaurant or café or who spit on the street. I also, as I have remarked, find distasteful, indeed downright vulgarly ugly, people who have great portions of their bodies tattooed and on plain display. Am I prejudiced against these matters and against people who
engage in them? Am I being ethnocentric about such things? Probably I am in some ways ethnocentrically snobbish here, but I certainly would not advocate laws to stop them or for me to display in any way my disapproval of their behavior. And not out of fear of being punched. Indeed, I would firmly resist laws which seek to prevent them from so acting. Let them be tattooed from head to toe if they so want, but not to try to force others to do likewise. I hope the fashion will die out. This seems to me the properly cosmopolitan reaction.

I think it is a good thing that there are laws restricting where people can smoke but not laws banning such things as I have listed above or things that bring out the ‘bad sides’ of people that do not hurt other people such as driving while using cell phones. Moreover, I would never show my distaste and disapproval of such non-harmful things. But I do not take ‘bad sides’ as to be purely emotive or subjective and I would not ban such spectacles though I would privately deplore them and continue to find them distasteful. Probably boxing and fighting in hockey bring out bad sides in people as well. One only needs to watch an audience at a boxing match or at a professional wrestling match to see quite clearly that it does. But it would be still more harmful to try to ban these things, though bullfighting and cockfighting should be banned. The cruelty to animals settles things here. Many things are distasteful, indeed plainly vulgar, and should be regretted but not banned. I do not want to be Kant’s grandparents or a character like Michael Kolhaus in Kleist’s novel with the same name.

There are always people who will not warm themselves around the tribal campfire. More in some cultures than in others and there are others who are out of step with aspects of their culture as I was when I was twenty years old on a merchant ship in the Pacific during World War II when the United States dropped two atomic bombs causing great misery and destruction on Japan. When we shortly afterwards heard about it on our ship and heard about the end of the war, my mates celebrated. Somehow I sensed in spite of my youth and naiveté that what happened was very wrong. I was glad that the war ended but not at the expense of such bombing. When I gave voice to that, I
was thoroughly ostracized on the ship. Like my mates, I wanted the war to end and was glad to see it was ending but certainly not in that way. I was as much as my shipmates concerned and desirous that the war should end. I was glad to see that it was ending but not with such momentous killing and destruction as that. And, as I learned rather later, that it was on the way to ending anyway and would have though not quite so quickly, but rapidly anyway and without that atomic nightmare. Despite the propaganda the atomic bombing was quite unnecessary. The Japanese were already practically on their knees.

However, at the time without that later understanding, I was in my rejection and reaction utterly alone on that ship. Later, I learned that I was not alone, though not until much later that we dissenting few were still in our rejection a tiny moral minority. But moral issues are not vote issues and are not legitimately decided by numbers. What is right and wrong is not determined even by how a vast majority thinks. Majorities, even vast majorities, may be mistaken, though we should, of course, think twice before we stand alone or even nearly so. As history reveals, that can be the thing to be done. Subsequently we have been grateful for such stand aloners. That has partly marked our progress but not always. Majorities, even vast majorities, can be mistaken. Our history is marked by stand aloners who have advanced things for we humans, often at great expense to themselves. But we have had our share of misguided fanatics or cranks or nuts as well. Sometimes it is utterly mistaken and arbitrary to stand alone. Sometimes it is a dogmatic fantasy. Still sometimes the stand aloner is right.

There is no algorithm anywhere concerning moral matters but, that notwithstanding, what the people believe on occasion is not always right or always to be accepted. This does not justify individualism but it does not justify majority-ism or mass-ism either.

How do we decide who, if anyone, is right? We decide it when we can discover it at all by getting our beliefs into wide reflective equilibrium. But the ancient Romans and we have very different wide reflective equilibria as we do as well with the Incas and the Aztecs and so on in many
places in the world and over history. Because something comes later doesn’t automatically mean it is better.

VII

Is there much prospect of gaining a worldwide cross-cultural wide reflective equilibrium? Do we not just have what in effect are different wide reflective equilibria—sometimes very different—with no way of non-arbitrarily deciding their relative adequacy? And will a contemporary cosmopolitanism, if it is on the mark, not just have to live with that? People will make different judgments, sometimes reflectively and judiciously, but that is all they are: different judgments and there is no wide consensus on which, if any, are taken to be the right ones or the best ones. There is no way of finding some super world-wide enclosing wide reflective equilibrium which would be the universal wide reflective equilibrium overriding all others including all the more local particular moral judgments or stances or normative orientations. This includes considered judgments. We have no Big Other, as Jacques Lacan liked to say. That certainly at least seems to be so. If we do not have such a universal Archimedean point, can we have, except as a bit of mythology or ideology, a worldwide wide reflective equilibrium? A universal perspective?

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find non-arbitrary clear criteria for what is acceptable and what is not here. It is often obvious how snobbish-type cosmopolitans will act when they take cognizance of this. They will continue to act as I have described and without guilt, self-reproach, ambivalence, or even, at least usually, self-questioning. But what of my kind of cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitanism that I think should be defended and rationally reconstructed? What will such cosmopolitans say about such things as I have just talked about? And there are many others like them. Will they properly count as cosmopolitan or not?

We have trouble over such matters. When, if ever, have red lines been crossed? Where a human practice is common, should we always approve of it where we are part of the society or
societies in which it is practiced or where we habit even briefly in a society except as liberators of a society that has brutalized its own inhabitants or others? History bedevils us here. Examples abound where practices are extant that should be changed or abandoned. That we should always do the thing done and in accordance with the existent practices seems to be clearly wrong. To take an example, the practices following a trend common in many cities that are rather corrupt that were followed by the recently (2012-13) deposed mayors of Laval and Montreal have been widely seen as scandalous. They city of London in the UK is even a possible example. Yet they were and still are widely tolerated. The same thing though vastly more extensive in Brazil with most of the official of its political parties were involved in corruption. They have in Laval and Montreal been routine for a considerable time. They became embedded in their political practices. That this is pervasively and for a long time so does not mean that we should not stop them or even that we cannot. That they are just forms of language that are forms of life that are in these and many societies does not mean they are uncriticizable. They are criticizable and we should criticize them. They are situations, many situations, where we should not go along with the thing done. It all depends on the situations, though never without being prepared to in particular instances break or partially break with that. Think of the trigger-happy police vis-à-vis the police in the United States. Black lives matter. Still, that we have established practices concerning policing is crucial. But they should be not only reflective but critical and knowledgeable. That is scant on the ground now. But where do we stand in aligning ourselves concerning that? We must recognize that we cannot get along without practices. How and in what way should we be critical?

That there are corrupt mayors who are democratically elected does not matter. No one should be above the law, though in practice many experience by way of criticism at best only a little finger tapping. Law brushes them lightly. And sometimes not at all. This, of course, is not only true in Quebec but routinely almost everywhere. To take an extreme but exemplary case, consider the grossly corrupt high political leaders in Pakistan. Or remember that the late non-lamented Adolf Hitler never
paid his taxes. Or consider, to take some different sorts of examples concerning deeply embedded social practices of some ancient complex societies, the Incas, Aztecs, and Romans. The Incas decapitated perfectly innocent people in ceremonial religious practices and ostentatiously displayed their severed heads and their priests ceremonially drank their blood. *Their* considered judgments were in accordance with that. Indeed, they proscribed these matters. They were standard religious moral practices in Inca-land. The Aztecs engaged in similar practices of horror and the much popularly loved Roman gladiatorial practices matched considerably well with the considered judgments of most Romans. It was there a doing of the thing done and it matched what was in effect their considered judgments in their wide reflective equilibria. Was it that their equilibria were not wide enough? Or that they did not know enough? If they had gained universal consensus would that be enough? Not everything that is practiced should have been practiced or should be practiced. Not all deeply embedded practices are morally acceptable. Not even those that have been or are practiced should have been or should be practiced. The Nazis are only a relatively recent very extreme case in some respects matched by Stalin's society. Milder versions are not uncommon, though much less taken notice of. We not infrequently find them in our backyards. Think of the late Ku Klux Clan and its hangings. Or think of its children and grandchildren such as the White Supremacy Movement in the United States and its attempted alliance with Donald Trump. Think of Golden Dawn in Greece. Think of what is now (2016) going on in Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen with Obama sometimes settling down with them with his nice moral rhetoric.

We cannot, wherever we are, avoid all reliance on the doing the thing done, including reliance on their considered wide reflective equilibrium in moral matters, including normative political or crucial matters. This may come to a near *universalization* of the maxim 'When in Rome do as the Romans do'. Do you mean accepting their gladiatorials? Think of the anti-Nazi Germans during the Second World War living in fear and trembling and out of fear with obligatory portrait of Hitler hanging on their living room walls. We should be careful with the maxim 'When in Rome do as the
Romans do’. Should Obama when in Saudi Arabia accord with what the Saudis do? It is one thing to do the thing because you regard it as right; it is another to do it out of fear. People can despise the society they live in and still live there. This regularly happens.

Rawlsian sophistications of appeals to considered judgments winnowed by wide reflective equilibrium help a bit (Rawls 1980; Nielsen 1993). But in such winnowing out, if something is to come of such a thing, heavy emphasis must be placed on how we ascertain appropriate considered judgments. And there needs to be an ascertainment of which they are. But there we are beleaguered by cultural diversity and historical contingency. Do we have in such an appeal to wide reflective equilibrium success for cosmopolitanism so that it has been shown to be the only rational and reasonable option that we have? It is difficult not to be in accord with that. What more do we need? Is classical cosmopolitanism or its rational reconstructions the only reasonable morally adequate game in town? Worldwide or in the West or anywhere? How do we, if we can, free our equilibria, even our wide reflective equilibria, of ethnocentricity, or at least some of it? And, assuming it can in some way be approximated, is it necessary for a cosmopolitan ethos to be a reality? Are contemporary Greeks more reasonable and more cosmopolitan than their ancestors? Should we not say in some respects yes and in some respects no and that there is no uncontested answer, everything considered? Many of we Westerners tend to think that we denizens of the West are more reasonable or at least have more adequate worldviews and a better social morality than our ancestors, particularly our ancient medieval ancestors. Some of us even think that our views are clearly superior to our other enculturated non-Western others. Once, I have been told, a distinguished Western philosopher was asked what he thought of the philosophy of the East. He answered that the only light that comes from the East is in the sun. I hope that is apocryphal; it is clearly ethnocentric. Can we, if we can be informed and toughminded, do anything more than sing a song of adaptation about in some fundamental respects about the thing done in our own society? With a yes in some respects and a no
in others. There is no everything considered answer. But are there any sound grounds for proclaiming moral progress?

If something like this is so and if what I have said about the necessity of appealing to considered judgments in wide reflective equilibrium in social moral institutions is also so, then if such a cosmopolitanism is to obtain as more than a dream we need a *worldwide* Archimedean point, a *global* wide reflective equilibrium, in the saddle. But isn’t that just a utopian dream? It certainly seems that we have at best to settle for wide plethora of reflective equilibria with their sometimes various considered judgments. But does this not doom cosmopolitanism? Even a rationally reconstructed one seems doomed. And is not this so?
Part Two: Cosmopolitanism and Reality

I

Cosmopolitanism that we have has scant empirical anchorage. But that does not mean that it is impossible. Moreover, it is mostly utopian. It can be de-mythologized but only at the price of it being made utterly utopian. Can we reasonably hope that the historical tradition of cosmopolitanism with its enlightenment values and orientation will gain traction as time goes by? Will the number of one-worlders increase? Are we on the way to getting decent societies in a decent world? It certainly doesn’t seem so. Still, neither Chomsky nor Glen Greenwald, both of whom are anything but starry-eyed, are despairing, though they see, rightly I think, that climate change threatens us with doom. But they have some reasons for optimism even with our world of horrors. We also have Sweden and Norway and broadly the rest of Scandinavia and the Netherlands. But the UK and the USA, plutocracies that they are, are not wonders to be admired. We humans may not, if we vigorously use our intelligence and non-evasive determination, drive ourselves to extinction and a world of horrors. But we shouldn’t bet our ranches on it. There is still a chance though day by day things are closing in on us.

Those of us who do not ourselves live in a world of personal horrors, or not yet, should take a non-evasive look at much—indeed very much—of how things go on in the world. Even in Europe. Look at Hungary, Austria, Poland and look beyond Europe and look as well at Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. To say nothing of the Central African Republic, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Sudan (North and South), Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Ukraine, Russia, China, Australia, Israel, Thailand, Myanmar, Canada, Indonesia, the United States. Though often in different ways, none of these places are places to sing about, let alone praise for their greatness. All of these places are places
where regularly an unnecessary assortment of horrors go on, though in some places worse than in others. Horrors that are quite unnecessary. The world is clearly not a place where life is greatly treasured, let alone respected. Though a few get well treated, they are only a few. Ill treatment is the norm.

Some people loudly trumpet about the greatness of America or proclaim loudly that they will make America great again. Well, it was better off during Franklin Roosevelt’s time than Ronald Reagan’s. But like many other nations in various ways, the United States has behaved badly most of the time. It is, pace Hillary Clinton, the indispensable nation.

Don’t divert your eyes and reflection from the mess we comparatively lucky Westerners have made of things and blame it all on Russia, China or Japan. But also take to heart and to head what ISIS, the Syrian government, Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the United States turning a blind eye at the atrocious behavior of Saudi Arabia and Egypt as it does to the Israelis’ behavior in Gaza while all the way lavishing arms on these countries making a considerable profit for the American arms industry. As It does vis-à-vis the gun industry to its own citizens. All in the name of political freedom.

We need not and indeed should not ignore the world’s by now seeming endless wars. The United States repeatedly sanctions and rides along with warring nations. In one way or another, it is involved. The wars in Syria, Afghanistan and Libya have led to a flood of desperate people fleeing to Europe to escape horrors and indeed an intolerable life and often to in one way or another being blocked.

It very much looks like our world is becoming increasingly horrible and brutal and sometimes, indeed far too often, it is increasingly becoming a destructive and vicious killing ground. This indeed is a hard thing to take. But isn’t it so? We should not take it in an alienated evasive way. We should not in that way face this challenge, if indeed that is a way to challenge it. We must instead fight it and seek to make it something that is not so. It is a hard thing to face but we must—morally and rationally must—struggle on in resistance to it with all our means. It may well be that we will be
defeated. But we must not give up. Local wars are usually not of the West’s making, though sometimes they are. But often the West is no place to halt them. Where people, as in Syria, are desperately trying to escape these wars we shouldn’t stick our heads in the sand. Pay attention to our world and don’t direct our eyes from it. Help end wars where we can. I don’t think the USA is very adept here, particularly when the war seems unending and brutal. Think of the war in Syria or South Sudan. Don’t be evasive here. Where we are faced with no respite with high numbers, not all of which are economic refugees, making lethally very dangerous migrations to escape the killing and destruction in their home countries. They flee dangerous places such as Syria, Afghanistan, Sudan and Ethiopia. They flee in desperation these horrors and the butchery of war in the hope for a better life or at least some hope for a less dangerous life and a less horrible life. Those of us who are lucky enough not to be so encumbered must—morally must—face the facts as non-evasively as we can and struggle for their surcease.

II

Before turning to the relation of this hard and depressing matter to cosmopolitanism, I will continue a bit with a rational reconstruction of a classically rooted modernized cosmopolitanism that I have begun to characterize. In the above section I tried to show how far we are from it and show some of the miles we need to go before we can decently rest. This rational reconstruction of classical cosmopolitanism is itself of a cosmopolitanism that has scant empirical anchorage. Not the rational reconstruction itself but what it is a rational reconstruction of. Classical cosmopolitanism and its development in enlightenment cosmopolitanism can be rationally reconstructed alright, but only at the cost of making classical cosmopolitanism utterly utopian. My rational reconstruction seeks to avoid that.

For all the would be cosmopolitans (social scientists, philosophers, writers, investigative journalists) they are not to be Trump-like vulgar with a crude and ordinary manner of speaking. They
should care about how they speak and how they act. In the UK they would not be like Graham Greene’s ‘ugly Americans’. They would not go in for what many English regard as a boorish manner. Remember how Graham Greene wrote about them. And think of Donald Trump as a superstar vulgarian. Such people are clearly not cosmopolitan. Indeed, they are not only non-cosmopolitan like Eisenhower or Diefenbaker. They are anti-cosmopolitans and the party of extensive anti-intellectualism in the United States. Remember how it was said of Adlai Stevenson that the people did not want a Hamlet in the White House.

Effete cosmopolitans so reacting to populist vulgarianism do not care about being loners or joiners. They care rather about not being vulgar or being thought to be vulgar. They want to go with the flow, to live a civilized unobtrusive commodious life. They are unconnected with politics or a radical rejection of politics. They seek not to be radical in anything but also wish very much not to be thought to be ordinary and particularly not to be taken to be blue collar. They regard that as vulage. They are neither Trump-like nor Sanders-like. Even Hillary Clinton with her rah-rah talk is taken not only to be too assertive but also to be somewhat vulgarly superior in her attitude while often coming out with platitudes. We should not go on as she does. All of this is in bad taste such cosmopolitans quietly believe, though they might rather reluctantly vote for her to keep that vulgar boor Trump out of the White House.

This effete ‘esthetic cosmopolitanism’ is very different from the anciently rooted and enlightenment rooted humanistic cosmopolitanism that I articulate and defend. But this is not at all to deny that this ‘esthetic and effete cosmopolitanism’ is a genuine cosmopolitanism, though one we could well do without. One might even despise it. But I am trying to characterize the varied world of cosmopolitanism, not commend all its varieties. So I cannot leave out this kind of cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism has many forms. We have had our share of misguided fanatics or crank cosmopolitans and unconnected politically numbed ones as well as reasonably well-meaning people
who have been tragically mistaken loners. *Sometimes* cosmopolitan people are utterly mistaken arbitrary stand aloners. Sometimes with dogmatic fantasies or huberistic illusions.

Still sometimes, and importantly, the stand-aloners are cosmopolitans who have done remarkably good things for humanity. Cosmopolitans are all over the map here. Noam Chomsky, George Monbiot, Glen Greenwald and Edward Said are striking examples of good cosmopolitans. But among such cosmopolitan intellectuals, even in their variety and *sometimes* clashing, they tend to be reasonable. Surely Chomsky, Monbiot, Greenwald and Said are that. Still, is just anyone right about crucial matters in such circumstances? Both Eric Hobsbawm and Tony Judt cannot have both been right concerning some fundamental matters. Perhaps both are wrong but they cannot both be right.

To be reasonable is one thing; to be right, to have got it just as it is, is another thing. Is anyone ever right, having gotten it just right, in many or any crucial circumstances? Some of us may think we are in those circumstances but thinking does not make it so. Being reasonable does not assure rightness. Still, at least most of these cosmopolitan intellectuals are reasonable and with this there is a collectively useful consensus even when it is not identical with being right or with ‘having the true point of view’. Sometimes we can be cosmopolitanally reasonable and do or believe what is desirable. Something we can and should prize. Something that is fallibilistically ascertainable and on the road to being what is likely to be right, when we can ascertain it at all, by getting our beliefs into wide reflective equilibrium. But is that sufficient to getting them right?

However, keep in mind here that the Ancient Greeks did not have what Rawlsians regard as a wide reflective equilibrium, though they had something that in effect had in some ways something like it. Still now we have a very different wide reflective equilibrium that leads to a considerable difference between the Ancient Greeks and us. And sometimes we can properly speak of an ‘us’ if we do not get essentialist about it.

*Perhaps* we should not work with, as I do, a basically Rawlsian method of wide reflective equilibrium. (See my Bibliography here.) Such an equilibrium is something of a methodology for
moral, political and otherwise normative assessment. I believe that is how we should go. But there is no consensus or determinate evidence that that is what is so or that it is what we should aspire to. Moreover, a philosopher or perhaps a theologian might think that there is or might be a culturally super perch for my evaluations. If we look at cultures, including their history, we will see, if ethnocentrism does not blind us, that there is no such perch. No such standpoint or point of view. No such non-contingent anything. Hume was on the ball about this here as he helped articulate the dawn of modernity.

III

A note on my manner of writing here. My ironical, metaphorical and sometimes emotive remarks are immersed in a system or, if you will, a network of practices located in forms of life. For them to have sense, to have a use, this must be so. But they do have sense—do have a use—and as so can be moral, political and social realities in some culture or group of cultures and sometimes some bits, some kernels, will be in all cultures. These are our ‘rational kernels’. Or perhaps I should say just kernels. In this way they must have universality and they cannot be just emotive or non-cognitive. This means there must be some universal bits of practice that are pervasive or all-encompassing. Indeed, they often are not. They turn out sometimes to be pseudo kernels. But there are also genuinely universal kernels.

My ironical, metaphorical and emotive account—my plain person account—fits with, squares with, requires (presupposes) such a practice-laden form of life. It requires, that is, a way of life such as I have articulated and within such a system as it has come to be exemplified and particularized. I think this is so and it is something that needs calling attention to. This does not show that all such systems must have the defects that I have called attention to. But some do without becoming inappropriate. And some who are in this way inappropriate are not noticed to be. And we are not always able to determine which is which. And while I have been revealing that the forms of life do
sometimes have such disquietudes that sometimes something is rotten not only in the Kingdom of Denmark, as Kierkegaard said, but also in the American Empire (*pax* America) as it sometimes has been called (and not without reason), I have called attention to some of the ways that forms of life are rotten that require no philosophy or science at all for their attainment and establishment. Still, plain persons’ talk and recognition are sufficient, though propaganda often stands in the way of its recognition.

Mine is one way to fight harmful and irrational ideologies. Something that the mass media typically hides. But *that* mass media unfortunately tends increasingly to be our eyes and ears. The way we see things. It can effectively dumb us down and/or muddle us. However, there is something here that worries me. It is something that is in the political and social life in our Western cultures as well as in cultures that are distinct from ours. It is in the right and in the center of our Western cultures the extent to which well disguised propaganda obstructs our view of things. *Sometimes* it may not even be deliberate but a matter of an unwitting ethnocentric orientation. The things that we are not told or indistinctly told and sometimes falsely told are staggering. What we are shrouded from or slantly told is mind numbing. I ask myself about the way we have been numbed and dumbed down. And I ask how to struggle against this. And if there is an escape from it or some way of resisting it. Some people do it with religious illusions. Do I with my plain talk avoiding metaphysical, theological, and much political theory inspired talk avoid all ideology? Indeed, avoid an ideology that will distort in some way my view? How can I be confident that I or indeed that anyone has escaped ideology or all cultural distortion? I cannot. No one can. But is this itself a groundless assertion of an Absolute? A pseudo Absolute? When does the merry-go-round stop?

I try very hard not to be so caught. Do I succeed in my efforts here? Can I or anyone *succeed in telling it like it is*? Can I give a rationally reconstructed cosmopolitanism that articulates something that is more than a cosmopolitan fantasy? Something, of course, I hope is so. But have I in my account of cosmopolitanism when I come to see it on the ground escaped from unwitting propaganda? I hope
in my factual account of cosmopolitanism that I have managed to somewhat tell it like it is. To square it with the facts and other warrantedly assertable moral and political sensibilities. But are there any such things? Well, my skepticism makes me wary of certainties but a good Davidsonian *fallibilism* is very likely sufficient. And that is distinct from skepticism or at least utter skepticism. Fallibilism is neither skepticism nor absolutism. Is it right to say it is the sensible way?
Part 3: A Kind of Cosmopolitanism

I

The defense of cosmopolitanism with its modernization rooted in the enlightenment that I shall articulate is humanistic and egalitarian. But it is not a cosmopolitanism in the forms that Marxists have rightly criticized.

But cosmopolitanism in any of its forms tends to be secularizing, though it is not always. There are cosmopolitans who are religious. T. S. Eliot, Graham Greene and Terry Eagleton are prestigious examples that are solidly religious. Still, cosmopolitanism fits well with laicity. Moreover, cosmopolitans, and fittingly, tend to be secularists. They tend to have views which are empirically validatable and tend to be wary of invalidatable moral claims or obscure philosophical claims or esoteric ones. Cosmopolitans usually stand with sustainable claims and claims they are attuned to in a world that is scientifically validatable. But this is a tendency but not a defining condition of cosmopolitanism.

Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey were paradigmatic cosmopolitans but they were very different from Eugene O’Neill or John Dos Passos who were also firm cosmopolitans. All these figures of a short time past were paradigmatic cosmopolitans.

However, to return to a consideration of the place of the social sciences in what I am calling a cosmopolitanism of and for our time. A rationally reconstructed one. If we go back a little in time to the work of the sociologist Thorstein Veblen, we will find a scientifically rigorous but humanistically and in effect, though not in name, a pragmatically oriented social science that provides a model of a cosmopolitanally ordered social scientist that is on the mark and is fundamentally such a cosmopolitanism as I am articulating for our time. It has its roots in classical cosmopolitanism and in
the Enlightenment but goes beyond them. James Joyce, Gunter Grass, John Steinbeck, Richard Rorty, Annette Baier, Kurt Baier as well as social scientists such as Amartya Sen, Michel Foucault, David Harvey, Eric Hobsbawm, Tony Judt, Niall Ferguson and Perry Anderson all were or are, at least in effect, cosmopolitans. A little further back and different from Thorstein Veblen there is John Dewey and Sidney Hook whom I also take to be cosmopolitans. Indeed, models of cosmopolitans. I do not speak of the later Sidney Hook’s anti-Communism.

But in stressing social science I perhaps have a too constrained view of modern cosmopolitanism. Think of all the literary, artistic, photographic (Lynne Cohen, for example) and cinematic figures who are cosmopolitans who do not work at all in social science and are little if at all influenced by it. Nor were most of them influenced by philosophy. Still, much of cosmopolitanism was influenced by social science. But most of the literary, artistic or cinematic figures were not very clearly, if at all, affected by social science. With the exception of the pragmatist philosophers Dewey and Hook who were very influenced by work in social science, this was not common with philosophers. Moreover, those philosophers much concerned with cosmopolitanism were not scientistic, except for Hook in name but not in practice. He was no more in reality scientistic than Dewey or James were. But the authors mentioned above were either social scientists or social science oriented. Of the people I have mentioned, particularly James Joyce, Gunter Grass and John Steinbeck did not to any extent have views about science. Moreover, their views about science and their scientific views (where they had or have them) are not all the same and none are developed. But they all fall under the umbrella of views or attitudes that are cosmopolitan. Joyce was certainly not a philosopher. But it is clear in his writings that he had a good understanding of Aquinas’s aesthetic theory.

What, then, is it to have a cosmopolitan view? There is no essence to be had here or something that could be called ‘essentially contested’ if indeed anything properly could be correctly so called. Cosmopolitanism is a diverse thing. Perhaps we should distinguish between being a cosmopolitan
theorist and just being a cosmopolitan? Cosmopolitans need not all be cosmopolitan theorists. But to be a cosmopolitan they must have some conception of what it is.

II

I turn now to another different sort of cosmopolitan person. They indeed will be broadly acknowledged as cosmopolitans by classical cosmopolitans, enlightenment cosmopolitans and contemporary philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum and Kwame Anthony Appiah. These different cosmopolitans that I shall now characterize are like the effete cosmopolitans who are not morally inspiring or even morally attractive. They are not attractive, at least for some I have characterized as cosmopolitans hitherto. Still, they are of a general type. But quite differently from the cosmopolitans I have hitherto discussed. They still are what Max Weber would call an ideal type or at least somewhat of an ideal type.

The type cosmopolitans I have in mind are rather indifferent concerning moral and political matters or uninterested in them. Uninterested as they generally are concerning principled matters. Kant would not intrigue them. They are indifferent or at least not interested in the various distinct moral and other similar matters, thinking of them all as matters of ‘You pays your money and you takes your choice’. Moral matters, they think, are nothing to get exercised about. Such cosmopolitans, such worldly unmoralistic persons at home in the world believe that what is important is to live and reason as a truly sophisticated person will reason and view things without being moralistically mystified or stupidified. Both a Kissinger and a Chomsky, radically different politically as they are, will attune themselves discretely so as not to be trumped by the mob or by Trump or suffer the displeasure of the ideologically encumbered and mystified. An intelligent and politically savvy cosmopolitan of this sort, like all cosmopolitans, will be at home in the world. But the politically savvy ones will be cautious about moralizing and go with what works, though this is not to characterize Kissinger or Chomsky. They tend to not be anti-moralistic but just un-moralistic. Their considered
view is that moral matters are nothing to get excited or exercised about and that they are often missed up with ideology. To think otherwise, they believe, is to be naïve and to be Quixotically out of touch with reality.

When one is living in any given society, such cosmopolitans believe, where at least the persons who run the show are such persons themselves, as they may be, these cosmopolitans believe, then one should at least outwardly take cognizance of and critically study whatever is the extant thing typically done in the culture in which one lives but circumspectively and critically. And one should not be a big trumpeter of such views or indeed a trumpeter at all. Chomsky, for example, understood and commented on his society and surrounding societies very well while remaining an anarchist socialist all his adult life.

Where there is some variance in the society in which they do what is done, then many such cosmopolitans do it in the least violent or dangerous way and in which way best makes it possible to stay loose. (I do not speak of Chomsky here.) The plain such cosmopolitan would not be very happy in a world ruled by Donald Trump but they would not be happy in any Alvin Plantinga ruled world either. If things turn out to be more incommoding, try at least to go with whatever flow is the most discernible less exuberant flow. And in all instances, go discretely for what they believe is the most commodious life available for them and their friends and intimates. Keep free of or stay loose from any ostentatious attachment or deep moral or political attachment. Keep free from any concern for ascertaining what is the right way and certainly from all commitments to a distinct way of life and most particularly one that tries to concern itself with what is in the human interest of all and for what is ‘really just’.

Don’t bother your head about whether anything like that can be ascertained or even with whether there is anything like that that could possibly be ascertained. Just do in the circumstances what is at hand in that circumstance you believe is the most commodious. But again don’t get exercised trying to ascertain what, if anything, is really genuinely commodious or really right.
Probably it is anyway mostly a personal matter. Stay loose. Say, or at least think, that such a cosmopolitan way is the way to flow. But do not make that or anything like that a pronouncement. Just go with the flow. But whatever one happens to do, so such cosmopolitans will conclude, one should take what one believes to be the most commodious way or at least, where all things are inconvenient, the least incommodious way. But don’t get stirred up about anything. Just go along with what you can and with what answers to your personal inclinations. Don’t get fussed with whether or not there could be the right way or even a right way to live. It may well be that there is no such thing.

Such a relaxed cosmopolitanism is not uncommon. Marxists were right in despising it. Still, we should recognize that it is not uncommon though very distant from the humanist cosmopolitanism I am attuned to. But to ascertain this one needs more than armchair thinking. Here anthropology, sociology and history are much more useful than philosophy, to say nothing of theology.

III

I will conclude this section with some general remarks. I wrote these last remarks during the Paris conference (2016) on climate change. It was being touted as a make-or-break conference and even said by some as a last chance to save ourselves. If we don’t keep temperatures from no more than a 2-degree rise, we will really be in trouble. Some say with no more than 1.5-degree rise. The call goes out, perhaps without exaggeration, if not now then never. There are good reasons to believe that this is not just hype by people who like to dramatize. However, climate conferences have regularly from Copenhagen on yielded a paucity of results. Moreover, the Paris conference did not start off well. Reporters were hamstrung. Demonstrators banned. In Copenhagen the big guns of the world arrived only at the end where the United States hammered home a rotten deal. There was something that was done but it was not very impressive. The coal industry in China and Poland continues to operate. In Paris the big guns arrived at the beginning and left after a few days, leaving
their lieutenants to work out the details. There is little to expect that the fossil fuel industries will be sufficiently reigned in. Something that is not surprising under capitalism, deadly as it is. Many influentially important are in a state of denial. Even the big political guns are not in control. Again, something that is not surprising. We can only almost despairingly hope that things will not be as bad as I and many others fear and that after sight will not reveal that our fears were justified. To repeat: even coal is at work.

All around misery is also on the rise. The Third World is a hell spread extensively with wars going on. There is considerable loss of troops in war as well with vast civilian losses and cities left in ruin. Much of urban Syria looks like Berlin at the end of World War II. Death rides high in some countries, e.g., Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, Libya. We have people desperately fleeing from murderous entrapment there to Europe, the Americas and Australia. Meanwhile, almost everywhere the rich get richer and the poor and middling strata poorer. One percent of the world’s population owns nearly fifty percent of the world’s wealth. Workers, full-time, part-time and, even worse, on call, are exploited and sometimes horribly so. And there is a shift to the right. Such is our wonderful democratic world as well as its non-democratic cousins.

Rampant prejudice rides high in the United States against Blacks and Latinos and to a certain extent now against Moslems replacing anti-Semitism, all nicely orchestrated by Donald Trump. And such matters are not limited to the United States. Some years ago in Calgary, two colleagues of mine, one from India and one from Pakistan, told me when they were walking together in the evening in the suburbs of Calgary when they were told by some young men ‘Paki, go home’. Ethnic prejudices flourish in almost all parts of the world, not just in the United States. In Canada and Quebec, we specialize in prejudice and bad treatment of First Nations people. The unmissed Stephen Harper would not even open an investigation into the frequent disappearances of First Nations women. What goes for Blacks in the United States goes for First Nations people in Canada. Blessings all around.
Things like this, indeed sometimes worse than them, go on through much of the whole world. That, of course, does not let us off the hook. We are certainly behaving very badly.

There are cosmopolitans particularly of the type I shall rationally reconstruct who condemn this who also despise it but there are cosmopolitans of another type who comfortably live with it. Turning their faces and minds away. Cosmopolitanism comes in many different flavors: good and bad and in between.

Cosmopolitans, particularly of the humanist egalitarian sort, do not have an easy ride anywhere. The anti-cosmopolitanism that is at home for so many of us everywhere, though more alive in Austria and Hungary than in Sweden and Denmark, is a wretched thing rooted in ignorance and a lack of respect for people who are different from themselves. Donald Trump is the current major spokesman for them in the United States. It would be a horror if he ended up in the White House. I hope those who reassure us that there is no chance of that are right. Hillary Clinton, whom I don't at all attune with, is the only one left in town to stop Trump. So hold your nose and vote for her and hope she will not be as bad as we have good reason to believe. But she will certainly be better than Trump. Do not be deceived. Hillary and Bill are cosmopolitan in their service of Big Corporate Capital. It is understandable that it turns off some people from politics. But we must not destroy our ballots or not vote. And we must also not succumb to neo-liberalism or conservativism either. Vote utterly strategically, hoping that this is the last time that we will have to do it.
Bibliography


